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efits rule in this case seems unfair." The purpose of the interceptor sewer
across respondent's property was to carry effluent from Burnsville to a
new sewage treatment plant. 2 Rather than justifying assessment solely
upon speculative market value considerations, the primary purpose rule
would first determine the purpose and effect of the improvement to
determine whether the sewer was constructed for the benefit of the
municipality, or for the local landowners, Moreover, the improvementtype distinction qualification to the special benefits rule would equitably apportion cost based on common experience regarding the effect of
certain improvements. Finally, because the foreseeable and restricted
use of respondent's property 3 was as a landfill and quarry, a determination of increased market value may have been based on mere speculation and conjecture as to future use. The result in Burnsville suggests
that Minnesota's special assessments policy should be reviewed.
Workers' Compensation- CALCULATION OF EARNINGS CAPACITYMathison v. Thermal Co., Minn. -, 243 N.W.2d 110 (1976).
Workers' compensation laws were developed to provide a system of
compensation to workers injured while at work.' Minnesota has adopted
this system, which imposes financial liability upon the employer without regard to fault.2 Under Minnesota law, compensation is based upon
41. See City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 Ill. 327, 331, 33 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1941) (it
is impossible to justify special assessment to finance interceptor sewers). But see Federal
Constr. Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal. App. 200, 215-19, 210 P. 536, 542-43 (1922) (city built new
sewage disposal plant and interceptor sewer and all city property assessed; entire city may
specially benefit from local improvement).
245 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1976).
42. In re Village of Burnsville,__ Minn ....
43. See Brief for Respondent at 21 (with regard to nearly all of respondent's property,
any use of land other than present use requires approval of Lower Minnesota River Watershed District, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, State Pollution Control
Agency, City of Burnsville, and Metropolitan Council).
1. The Interim Commission on Industrial Accident Compensation and State Industrial
Insurance, Report to the Legislature of Minnesota, MINN. S. JOUR. 131 (1921) stated:
The underlying theory of the new system of compensation is that it is for the
welfare of society as a whole that all employe receive certain designated benefits
payable in installments, as wages are payable, rather than that a few only of
the injured should receive larger amounts in a lump sum; a considerable part
of which was often consumed by attorney's fees and expenses of litigation and
the balance often lost through unwise business ventures or extravagent living.
2. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(2) (1976) (emphasis added) provides in part:
Every such employer is liable for compensation according to the provisions of
this chapter and is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury
or death of his employee arising out of and in the course of employment without
regard to the question of negligence, unless the injury was intentionally selfinflicted or when the intoxication of the employee is the proximate cause of the
injury.
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the injured employee's inability to earn the salary he received prior to
his injury.' The amount of compensation is then two-thirds of the difference between what the employee earned at the time of the injury and
what he is able to earn thereafter.' Ii. analyzing what the employee is
able to earn, post-injury wages are considered an important, but not
conclusive, factorA In Mathison v. Thermal Co.' the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a compensation award should
be granted to an employee whose post-injury wages exceeded his preinjury wages.
In Mathison an employee, who worked at a city desk processing orders, received a head injury which arose out of and in the course of his
employment. Three years later, a seizure disorder was diagnosed as
causally related to that injury. The disorder was controllable by medication, but precluded the employee from engaging in various activities,
including working around machinery with moving parts. He remained
with the company for five years after the injury, received several raises,
and upon termination, obtained similar employment at another company. 7
The Workers' Compensation Board found that the employee had sustained a fifty percent general permanent partial disability but refused
to grant a monetary award because the claimant's post-injury earnings
were greater than his earnings at the time of the injury.' The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of compensation, concluding that
The employee's right to recovery arises under the Workers' Compensation Act as a
contractual right rather than a right arising out of tort. See Cunning v. City of Hopkins,
258 Minn. 306, 317-18, 103 N.W.2d 876, 885 (1960) (employee's horseplay did not affect
his ability to recover under the Act); Lewis v. Connolly Constr. Co., 196 Minn. 108, 111.
12, 264 N.W. 581, 583 (1936) (recovery based on contractual right).
The intent of the legislature in adopting the Workers' Compensation Act was to provide
a more certain, speedy, and definite recovery for injured employees in contrast to the slow
and uncertain possibilities of litigating every injury. See Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258
Minn. 306, 318, 103 N.W.2d 876, 885 (1960); Kaletha v. Hall Mercantile Co., 157 Minn.
290, 293, 196 N.W. 260, 262 (1923).
3. The compensation awarded under the Workers' Compensation Act is predicated on
a reduction in the amount of wage that the injured employee is able to earn after the
accident. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101(1)-(3) (1976).
For occupational diseases MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1) (1976) defines disability as: "the state
of being disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employee was last
employed .... " For an example of the application of the occupational disease definition
of disability, see Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 401, 115 N.W.2d 22, 28
(1962).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1976).
5. Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 430-31, 104 N.W.2d 546, 550 (1960)
(actual wages do not measure earning capacity but create a presumption of that capacity).
6. - Minn. , 243 N.W.2d 110 (1976) (per curiam).
7. Id. at
, 243 N.W.2d at 111.
8. Id. The employee was earning $122.25 per week when he was injured and approximately $150.00 per week at the time of the compensation hearing.
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the post-injury wages, in this situation, were an accurate measure of
the claimant's capacity to earn.' Additionally, the court, in response to
the claimant's assertion that the post-injury wages should be reduced
to account for inflation," found no basis in the Workers' Compensation
Act for an inflationary adjustment, stating that such an adjustment was
the responsibility of the legislature."
Recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act is achieved by a
showing that a claimant has suffered a disabling injury. Disability in
the workers' compensation sense is a bifurcated concept which considers both the extent of physical injury and the inability to earn wages. 3
Additionally, disability is classified by duration, temporary or permanent, and by degree, partial or total." Once a disability is established
the amount of the compensation award is determined either on a prearranged, scheduled" percentage of the claimant's wage at the time of the
injury or, for nonscheduled injuries," on a percentage of the decrease in
9. Id. at

-,

243 N.W.2d at 112.

10. Id.
11. The Minnesota Legislature has provided for an inflationary adjustment in the payment of benefits for temporary, partial, total, and permanent total disability. See MINN.
STAT. § 176.645 (1976) (formula employed to adjust the amount of benefits based on the
state's average weekly wage).
12. Workers' compensation is unlike tort law because it does not compensate for injuries received but rather for disabilities resulting from those injuries. See 1 A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.40 (1972). Factors which the courts consider to
establish disability include age, general physical condition, education, employment record, and the type of work available in the general community. See Reese v. Preston
Marketing Ass'n, 274 Minn. 150, 153, 142 N.W.2d 721, 723 (1966).
13. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WOaKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.10, at 10-4 (1976).
14. There are four categories of disabilities under MiN. STAT. § 176.101 (1976): temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, and permanent total. These terms are
not specifically defined in the Act. Total disability, however, is defined in MINN. STAT. §
176.101(5) (1976) which states:
The total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms at
the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial
members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent
loss of mental faculties, or any other injury which totally incapacitates the
employee from working at an occupation which brings him an income constitutes total disability.
See also Mastellar v. Nelson Co-op Creamery, 299 Minn. 210, 211, 216 N.W.2d 836, 837
(1974) (employee is totally disabled if no reasonably stable market exists for services that
he is able to perform in his injured state).
15. Scheduled injuries are those injuries which are readily identifiable, such as the loss
of an arm or leg, and for which there is a specific compensation amount established. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3) (1976). Where an injury is scheduled a loss of earnings
capacity is presumed. See, e.g., Boquist v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 Minn. 14, 16-17,
209 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (for scheduled injuries loss of earnings capacity is conclusively
presumed regardless of an employee's ability to work at the same or greater earnings).
16. Compensation for nonscheduled injuries is governed by MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 3(49) (1976) which states in part: "In all cases of permanent partial disability not
enumerated in this schedule the compensation shall be 66 2/3 percent of the difference
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the claimant's earning capacity. 7
Benefits for scheduled injuries are established as a certain percentage,
usually two-thirds, of the wage at the time of the injury'" and are paid
to the claimant for a number of weeks, varying with the severity of the
injury.' 9 Examples of injuries included in the scheduled benefits are the
loss of an arm, leg, or hand-severe permanent injuries for which a loss
can readily be presumed. 2
When the injury is not the type included on the scheduled lists, as was
the injury in Mathison,2' the amount of compensation must be calculated separately. Two major theories have emerged for this determination:12 the "whole man" theory, used in only a few states, and the "loss
of earnings capacity" theory. The "whole man" theory bases compensation on the functional loss sustained by the claimant. 3 Under this theory
between the daily wage of the worker at the time of the injury and the daily wage he is
able to earn in his partially disabled condition .... "
17. Capacity to earn is a theoretical concept which is not defined in the Act. The choice
of the words, "able to earn," indicates the legislature's intent not to use the amount of
actual wages earned after the injury as the standard by which earning capacity is measured. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.21 (1976). But see Roberts
v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 430-31, 104 N.W.2d 546, 550 (1960) (actual wages
create a presumption of earning capacity). Other courts consider the employee's previous
work history, education, training, the nature of the work performed, the nature and degree
of the injury, and the effect of the injury on the employee's activities. See, e.g., Latour v.
Producers Dairy, Inc., 102 N.H. 5, 148 A.2d 655 (1959). See generally Riesenfeld, Basic
Problems in the Administration of Workmen's Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REv. 119
(1952).
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(21) (1976) ("For the loss of an eye, 66 2/3
percent of the daily wage at the time of injury during 160 weeks.
...).
19. Compare, e.g., id. § 176.101, subd. 3(21) (65 weeks of compensation for loss of
thumb) with, e.g., id. § 176.101, subd. 3(36) (500 weeks of compensation for the loss of
one arm and one foot).
20. See id. § 176.101, subds. 3(15), 3(18)-(19).
21. The seizure disorder suffered by Mathison was found by the Workers' Compensation
Board to be a nonscheduled injury. Minn. at , 243 N.W.2d at 111.
22. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.10, at 10-10 (1976).
Larson mentions a third theory, actual wage loss, and cites Pennsylvania as a jurisdiction
adopting this theory. The Pennsylvania courts have, however, looked to factors other than
wage loss in determining whether compensation should be awarded. See Benedict v. Fox,
192 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 201, 159 A.2d 756, 758 (1960) (age, education, industrial background, and actual wages earned considered in determining partial disability).
23. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(d) (1976), which states:
A permanent partial disability not scheduled . . . shall be apportioned to the
body as a whole, which shall have a value of 450 weeks, and there shall be paid
compensation to the injured employee for the proportionate loss of the body as
a whole resulting from the injury.
The "whole man" theory is only applicable for calculating the length of time that
compensation will be paid for a nonscheduled injury. See Moyers Bros. v. Poe, 249 Ark.
984, 462 S.W.2d 862 (1971) (scheduled injury could not be apportioned to the body as a
whole in determining extent of permanent partial disability). But see Glass v. Edens, 233
Ark. 786, 787, 346 S.W.2d 685, 686 (1961) ("Ark. Stats. § 81-1313(d), when read in light
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the human body is given a maximum recovery amount, expressed in
weeks, with the loss of a body member awarded a proportion of the total
body amount. 4
The second approach used to establish benefits for nonscheduled injuries is the "loss of earnings capacity"2 test, which compares the claimant's wages at the time of the injury with the wages the claimant is able
to earn subsequent to the injury.2" The claimant's post-injury earnings
capacity is the most difficult concept to calculate accurately, with the
compensation boards usually looking to the claimant's wage at the time
of the compensation hearing." Additionally, compensation boards will
examine the entire wage history of the claimant subsequent to the injury.2" In Mathison, for example, the board and court relied upon the
fact that the employee received periodic raises following the injury; was
receiving an average wage for his job; and was, throughout the postinjury period, receiving a wage equal to or greater than that at the time
of the injury. 9
Minnesota has legislatively adopted the "loss of earnings capacity"
test in subdivision 3(49) of Minnesota Statutes section 176.101, which
mandates that two-thirds of a decrease in earnings capacity shall be
awarded as compensation.0 The calculation of the subsequent earning
capacity is critical because if extrinsic variables are allowed to increase
the level of post-injury wages to an amount equal to or greater than the
pre-injury wage, no award can be made by the board." The only criteria
of other sections of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which are not in conflict therewith,
does not mean merely functional disability but includes, in varying degrees in each instance, loss of use of the body to earn substantial wages.").
24. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(d) (1976).
25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1976). See generally 2 A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.21, at 10-24 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Peters v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 223 Minn. 168, 172-73, 26 N.W.2d
29, 31-32 (1947) (the test is percentage loss of earning ability not the loss of physical
ability); Enrico v. Oliver Iron Min. Co., 199 Minn. 190, 191, 271 N.W. 456, 457 (1937)
(degree of physical disability not proper basis for determining the award). Minnesota
courts have construed permanent partial benefits as compensation for loss of earnings, and
not indemnity for loss of member or function of the body. See Pramschiefer v. Windom
Hosp., 297 Minn. 212, 211 N.W.2d 365 (1973) (per curiam); Boquist v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 297 Minn. 14, 17, 209 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (basic principle of compensation law
is that benefits relate to loss of earnings capacity and not physical injury).
27. See Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 431, 104 N.W.2d 546, 550 (1960)
(actual wages will presume post-injury earning capacity unless rebutting circumstances
are shown).
28. See, e.g., Mathison v. Thermal Co.,

-

Minn ....

243 N.W.2d 110, 111-

12 (1976) (dictum) (five-year post-injury employment history considered by the Workers'
Compensation Board).
29. Id. at

-,

243 N.W.2d at 112.

30. See note 16 supra.
31. See Mathison v. Thermal Co.,

-

Minn

-...

243 N.W.2d 110, 111 (1976)

(compensation denied claimant because at all times material to the action, claimant's
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which should be allowed to affect the wage amounts is the injury itself.2
When factors, such as the inflationary effects on wage levels, are not
discounted, a true comparison of pre- and post-injury wages cannot be
attained.
The object of the "loss of earnings capacity" theory is to ascertain
what decrease in earnings capacity the claimant suffered because of his
injury." To achieve this objective, the effects of all variables except the
injury should be removed from computation of the post-injury wage."
The variables which are usually excluded from the post-injury wage
include: an inflationary change in the wage level,35 an increase in the
hours worked for the wage period,36 a change in the claimant's age from
minority to adult, 37 a change in the claimant's training," and sympathy
wages equaled or exceeded the wages earned at the time of the injury). Compare MINN.
STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1976) (compensation based on two-thirds of the difference
in wages) with id. § 176.101, subd. 3(1)-(38) (compensation predicated solely on percentage of the wage earned at the time of injury).

32. See 2 A.

LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 57.21, at 10-38 to -39

(1976). Professor Larson states:
The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables,,
to determine the wage that would have been paid in the open labor market
under normal employment conditions to claimant as injured, taking wage levels,
hours of work, and claimant's age and state of training as of exactly the same
period used for calculating the actual wages earned before the injury. Only by
elimination of all variables except the injury itself can a reasonably accurate
estimate be made of the impairment of earnings capacity to be attributed to
that injury.
Id.
33. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.32 (1976) (post-injury
wages should be corrected to reflect any increase in wage levels); McCullough, Workmen's
Compensation-PermanentPartial Disability Benefits-The Dilemma, 24 U. KAN. L.
REv. 627, 634 (1976) (injured claimant's pre-injury wages should be increased by any
inflationary factor prior to comparison with claimant's post-injury wages).

34. See 2 A. LARSON,

THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 57.21 (1976).

35. See Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 346, 227 P.2d 230, 235 (1951) (reduction or increase in earnings due to general business conditions cannot be considered by
the commission in fixing the amount of compensation); Maxey v. Major Mechanical
Contractors, 330 A.2d 156 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (post-injury earnings must be corrected
to wage level at the time of injury to compensate for the effect of inflation).
36. See DiMezzo v. G. Levar & Co., 281 App. Div. 719, 719, 117 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1952)
(part-time wages for jobs ancillary to regular employment are excluded in determination
of reduced earnings); Devlin v. Iron Works Creek Const. Co., 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 481, 486,
66 A.2d 221, 224 (1949) (if overtime and double time are included in computation of
earnings after the accident they should also be included in pre-injury earnings computations). But see Reeves v. Echota Cotton Mills, 123 Ga. App. 649, 182 S.E.2d 126 (1971)
(greater number of weekly hours increased claimant's total weekly compensation above
the pre-injury level and therefore compensation award was denied despite lower hourly
wage caused by the injury).
37. The problem of determining compensation based on the wages of a minor is specifically addressed in MINN. STAT. § 176.101(6) (1976) which reads:
If any employee entitled to the benefits of this chapter is a minor or is an
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by the employer or co-workers.3 9 Factors such as these can also have a
deflationary effect on the post-injury wage and, in those instances, must
be added to the post-injury wage. The elimination of the effects from
all variables in the post-wage amount achieves a more just result because the resulting wage amount would correspond more closely to the
wage which existed at the time of the injury.
The Mathison court indicated that the post-injury wage received by
the employee created a presumption of earning capacity ° but that this
presumption was rebuttable. Ostensibly, this presumption can be rebutted by showing variables which would adversely inflate or deflate the
wage. In Mathison, however, the court specifically refused to reduce the
post-injury wage by discounting the general wage level increase that had
occurred." The Mathison court found no basis for an inflationary adjustment in the Workers' Compensation Act.4" This position apparently
overlooks Minnesota Statutes section 176.64511 where the legislature has
apprentice of any age and sustains a personal injury arising out of and in the
course of employment resulting in permanent total or permanent partial disability, for the purpose of computing the compensation to which he is entitled for
said injury the compensation rate for temporary total, temporary partial, retraining, permanent partial or permanent total disability shall be the larger of
either the statewide average weekly wage or the employees [sic] weekly wage,
but in no case shall the compensation exceed the maximum weekly compensation rate payable under this chapter.
See also Torres v. Trenton Times Newspaper, 64 N.J. 548, 317 A.2d 361 (1974) (judicial
adjustment of wages for a minor/adult wage distinction).
38. See, e.g., Taber v. Tole, 188 Kan. 312, 362 P.2d 17 (1961) (award granted laborer
could not be reduced merely because claimant obtained employment as a teacher); State
Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Reagan, 337 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (permanent
disability suffered by claimant at age sixteen was not mitigated by subsequent high school
and college degrees). But see Desrosiers v. Dionne Bros. Furniture, Inc., 98 N.H. 424, 426,
101 A.2d 775, 777 (1953) ("If claimant's wages after injury reflect his actual earning
capacity as an injured man and they show no loss in his capacity to earn as compared
... ).
with his average wage before injury then he is not entitled to compensation.
39. See, e.g., Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 Kan. 849, 176 P. 640 (1918) (assistance from
fellow employees); Hurwitz' Case, 280 Mass. 477, 182 N.E. 832 (1932) (employer sympathy).
, 243 N.W.2d at 112 ("actual, concrete evidence of earnings is
40. __
Minn. at not to be disregarded by the commission and, in fact, creates a presumption of earnings
capacity").
243 N.W.2d at 112.
41. Id. at -,
42. The court summarily dismissed appellant's arguments concerning the general wage
level rise by stating the legislature did not provide for any adjustment. Id.
43. MINN. STAT. § 176.645 (1976) states in part:
For injuries occurring after October 1, 1975 for which benefits are payable ..
the amount being paid to the employee by the employer shall on October 1,
1976, and each October 1 thereafter be adjusted by multiplying the benefit
payable prior to each adjustment by a fraction, the denominator of which is the
statewide average weekly wage for December 31, 21 months prior to the adjustment and the numerator of which is the statewide average weekly wage for
December 31, nine months prior to the adjustment.
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provided that compensation benefits shall be adjusted annually to reflect inflationary or deflationary economic changes. Although this statutory section addresses the modification rather than the determination
of awards, it would seem unreasonable for the legislature to have intended that inflationary factors be considered only after an award is
established. This is particularly true when the "loss of earnings capacity" test is used because the inclusion of inflationary factors in the postinjury wage amount may preclude a just award of benefits.
Courts in Delaware" and Arizona,4 5 as well as the leading authority
in the workers' compensation field, 6 have adopted the approach that the
effects of all variables should be eliminated from the post-injury wage.
Only by an adjustment of this type can an equitable determination of
an award be achieved. In Mathison, for example, the claimant's wages
increased nineteen percent from the date of the injury to the hearing
date while inflation during this period increased the average wage, for
a position similar to the claimant's, over forty-five percent. 7 Reduction
in the post-injury wage by the inflationary factor present during this
period may have precluded a denial of compensation.
The only accurate indication of a change in earnings capacity, upon
which an award should be predicated, is one in which the sole factor
influencing a change in the wages received is the injury. To achieve this,
post-injury wages must be adjusted to eliminate inflationary effects,
and, in this manner, produce a more accurate analysis of the effect the
injury has upon the wages earned. Only in this manner can claimants
be assured they will not be denied compensation due to factors beyond
their control.
44. In Maxey v. Major Mechanical Contractors, 330 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974), the court found the following seven factors should be eliminated from any calculation of the post-injury earnings capacity of the claimant: (1) employer gratuities; (2) increased education and training of the employee; (3) employee working longer hours at
lower wages; (4) general increase in the wage scale; (5) wages as an inducement to the
employee not to pursue a claim; (6) employee's minority at the time of the injury; and
(7) employment after the injury of an uncertain duration.
45. See, e.g., Altamirano v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Ariz. App. 379, 527 P.2d 1096 (1974)
(inflationary factors should be removed from the computation of recoveries for permanent
injury).
46. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.21 (1976).
47. The employee earned $122.50 per week at the time of the injury and approximately
$150.00 per week at the time of the hearing. This amounts to a 13% increase in wages.
Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that factory wages in Minnesota rose
45% during the period from 1968 to 1974. Compare Gross Weekly Hoursand Gross Weekly
and Hourly Earnings, [1968] LAoa RELATIONS Y.B. 479 (BNA) with Average Weekly
Hours and Gross Weekly and Hourly Earnings, [19741 LABOR RELATIONS Y.B. 479 (BNA).
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